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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses three issues that could potentially affect
macroeconomic stability and hence the speed of Croatia’s accession to
the European Union (EU): (i) Can the economy continue to rely on
domestic demand as the main source of growth or is stronger reliance
on exports necessary in the medium term? (ii) Is the external current
account deficit in Croatia “excessive” and how have high deficits been
corrected in the past? (iii) Does the expansion of bank credit to the pri-
vate sector carry the seeds of macroeconomic instability? The paper
argues that clearer signs of healthier growth have emerged since 2000,
and that the Croatian economy should be able to adjust to the widening
external deficit in 2002–03 in an orderly manner. However, there are
reasons to be concerned about the expansion of private sector credit, as
recently it has been financed largely by foreign borrowing. Large capi-
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tal inflows are likely to become the main challenges for macroeconom-
ic policy in the run-up to Croatia’s EU accession. Policy makers will in
particular have to address the so-called “Tošovský dilemma”, i.e., set
interest rates at an appropriate level: setting them too high would invite
excessive short-term inflows, while setting them too low would lead to
excessive investment and thus inflation. 
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INTRODUCTION
Many Croatian citizens presently hope and expect that Croatia
will join the EU in 2007. Since the government submitted its EU mem-
bership application in February 2003, the ability to meet the conditions
for EU accession has become the subject of almost daily assessments in
virtually every sphere of economic, social and political life in the coun-
try. Macroeconomic stability is usually not seen as a major issue in this
context. One reason is that good macroeconomic performance is not per
se a condition for the accession: the key economic criteria are the exis-
tence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. As the expe-
rience of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain around the time they
joined the EU has shown, these criteria can be satisfied even without a
distinguished record of macroeconomic performance. Another reason is
that macroeconomic stability is now largely taken for granted – low
inflation, a stable exchange rate and a reasonable growth rate have been
maintained since late 1993 despite considerable changes in the domes-
tic and external economic environment. 
Over the past year, however, the Croatian economy has started
to face some new macroeconomic challenges. This paper focuses on
three issues in particular: (i) Can the economy continue to rely on
domestic demand as the main source of growth or is stronger reliance
on exports necessary in the medium term?; (ii) Is the external current
account deficit in Croatia “excessive” and how have high deficits been
corrected in the past?; and (iii) Does the expansion of bank credit to the
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private sector carry the seeds of future macroeconomic instability?
These issues may have an important bearing on the speed of Croatia’s
accession to the EU. For instance, evidence that the economy returns
quickly to a normal growth path following a reversal of current account
deficits provides certain assurance that rapid growth could be sustained
in the medium term, which should facilitate Croatia’s accession efforts.
On the other hand, evidence that adjustment is slow or partial may indi-
cate that imbalances are accumulating. In that case, the imbalances may
eventually have to be resolved through a crisis, which is bound to be
costly in terms of growth and could delay Croatia’s accession to the EU.
The main message of the paper is that there are reasons for cau-
tious optimism on the outlook for continued macroeconomic stability.
First, evidence of healthier growth seems to have emerged in the past
few years (see Section 2). Contrary to widespread belief, the role of pri-
vate consumption as a source of growth has not increased dramatically
in recent years, and the share of consumption in GDP has yet to reach
levels considered to be normal at this stage of development. More
importantly, investment has strengthened and its structure has
improved, while government consumption is no longer a major driver
of growth. On the external side there is clearly considerable room for
stronger and cyclically more stable contribution of exports to growth.
However, a review of the experience of countries that have followed an
export oriented growth strategy cautions against heavy intervention to
promote selected export industries. This experience also points to the
key role of strong domestic competition for sustainable growth. 
If one admits that growth in the long term need not be driven
solely by exports and that strong contribution of domestic demand is
essential for balanced growth, a key question becomes how the econo-
my adjusts to occasional surges in domestic demand and external
deficits. The conclusion in Section 3, which studies past episodes of
current account adjustment, is on the whole encouraging: the Croatian
economy has so far reversed current account deficits fairly quickly.
This provides at least some assurance that the correction of the external
deficit, which widened considerably in 2002 and the first half of 2003,
could proceed in a more or less orderly manner, i.e., through slower
growth of private consumption, imports and investment on the one side,
and a rebound in exports on the other. 
As regards the credit expansion, the assessment in Section 4 is
more cautious. The latest lending boom has exceeded a common bench-
mark for the “safe” expansion of private sector lending. More impor-
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tantly, the expansion has been almost entirely financed by foreign bor-
rowing, raising concerns about the accumulation of external debt and
banking system vulnerability, despite the fact that prudential indicators
for the banking sector are at present relatively favourable.
Concluding the paper, Section 5 elaborates on some challenges
for macroeconomic policies that are hardly being discussed in Croatia
at present. In particular, based on the experience of other accession
countries, it seems likely that the main challenge in the run-up to the
EU accession will be how to handle large capital inflows. Such inflows
pose a fundamental dilemma for monetary policy to which there are no
clear answers. But the more policy makers know about other countries’
experiences, the greater the chances that this symptom of success will
not be a harbinger of instability.  
SOURCES OF GROWTH: DOMESTIC
DEMAND VS. EXPORTS
What is exactly the record of growth in Croatia in recent years?
Has economic growth been sacrificed for the sake of maintaining low
inflation and exchange rate stability, as many critics have argued? Has
more recently the quality of growth been sacrificed for the sake of tem-
porarily raising the rate of GDP growth through a “boom” in private
consumption and public investment? Or has the growth performance
become more sustainable in recent years? This section attempts to shed
some light on these questions.
Signs of healthier growth since 2000
When analysing sources of growth it is common to look at con-
tributions to GDP growth rather than growth rates of different compo-
nents of GDP.i Figure 1 thus shows data on GDP growth and its sources
from 1995 through the first half of 2003. This period was chosen
because macroeconomic performance in earlier years was severely dis-
torted by the effects of the Homeland War (which partly also affected
the 1995 data) and the initial stages of economic transformation. The
average annual growth rate during this period was 4.2%. Three points
stand out. 
24
Figure 1 GDP growth and its sources, 1995-2003 (percentage points)
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• The main source of growth since 1995 has been domestic demand.
Because of weak performance of exports relative to imports, the con-
tribution of the external sector (measured by net exports, that is,
exports minus imports of goods and services) was on average nega-
tive over this period. The external sector was a more important source
of growth than domestic demand only during the period of weak
growth in 1998–2000. However, except in 2000, net exports made a
positive contribution to growth because of import compression rather
than export expansion.
• In 1995 and 1997, the sources of growth were clearly unbalanced.
However, in both cases the imbalance was corrected in the subsequent
year (see Section 3). Both these years were also exceptional in that
growth of domestic demand was driven by the post-war recovery of
private consumption and investment in reconstruction. This is not sur-
prising given that private consumption declined by 8% in real terms
between 1991 and 1994, and investment by 6.5%.
• In 2002 and the first half of 2003, there was a similar but smaller
imbalance between the domestic and external sources of growth. The
issue here is, hence, to what extent this imbalance will be reversed by
the end of 2003 and in 2004. Data for the third quarter of 2003 and
current projections for the full year indicate that adjustment is already
underway (see Section 3), so it remains to be seen whether it will be
sustained.
To gain further insight into the question of growth sustainabili-
ty, Figure 2 decomposes domestic demand growth. One can easily
notice changes in the composition of growth between the period
1995–2000 and the period since 2001. Thus, while the role of personal
consumption as a source of growth has been on average more or less
constant, government consumption has played a significantly smaller
role as a source of growth since 2001. Another positive development
has been a strong revival of investment since 2001, in particular after
negative contributions to GDP growth in 1999 and 2000. 
Figure 2 Changes in sources of domestic demand growth (period averages)
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Changes in GDP shares of aggregate demand components also
suggest that the pattern of growth may have become more sustainable
in the past few years. Figure 3 (left panel) indicates that the rising share
of private consumption since 2000 reflects a recovery from a trough in
1999. In fact, the share of private consumption in the first half of 2003
(about 61% of GDP) was lower than in 1995 (64% of GDP). By com-
parison, the average share of private consumption in GDP for a sample
of the 23 largest emerging market economies during 1980–2002 was
73% (in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, from 71–75%).
Thus, rather than being excessive, one could argue that private con-
sumption in Croatia has yet to catch up with a level that can be consid-
ered normal at this stage of economic development. Figure 3 also
makes clear the decline in the share of government consumption (from
28% of GDP in 1999 to 22% since 2002), and the sharp increase in the
share of investment.ii
Figure 3 Composition of domestic demand, 1995-2003:H1 (percent of GDP)
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Changes in the structure of investment have also been encourag-
ing. Between 1996 and 2001, the share of private investment rose from
72% to 77% of the total, while that of public investment fell from 28%
to 23%. Furthermore, the share of equipment rose, indicating a shift to
a more growth-oriented structure of investment (Figure 4). In interna-
tional comparison, the share of investment in Croatia (about 25% of
GDP in 2002) was the same as the average for a sample of the 23 largest
emerging market economies between 1994 and 2002, but lower than in
the more advanced transition and emerging economies, where invest-
ment accounts for 28–33% of GDP. Thus, Croatia also has to catch up
– rather than slow down – as regards the rate of investment.
Figure 4 Composition of investment, 1996-2001
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A final point to note is that Croatia’s exports of services have
become larger than its exports of goods since 2001. Thus, focusing on
merchandise exports, which have stagnated at about $4.5 billion per
year since 1995, ignores the other, much more dynamic half of
Croatia’s total exports – that of services. And when exports of services
are taken into account, the share of exports of goods and services in
GDP has increased significantly in recent years, rising from under 40%
of GDP in 1998 to 46% in 2002. Since Croatia’s exports are highly cor-
related with imports, the share of imports has also increased, but by less
than the share of exports.
In summary, recent macroeconomic performance points to sev-
eral signs of healthier growth since 2000. In particular, there has been
an improvement in the structure of domestic demand. If these trends are
sustained, growth will have firmly shifted towards a healthier pattern.
One should not forget, however, that the main components of growth
continue to follow a rather pronounced cyclical pattern, with periods of
rapid expansion in domestic demand and deterioration in net exports
followed by contraction (or slower growth) in domestic demand and
improvement in net exports. This growth pattern is fairly typical of
emerging market economies and has been also observed in successful EU
accession countries over the past few years. For instance, the shift towards
domestically driven growth became apparent in 2001 and has strength-
ened in 2002–03 throughout central Europe because of the stagnation
of the western European export market (see Chapter III in BIS, 2003). 
Changing views on export-oriented growth
Despite indications that growth trends in Croatia are on the
whole becoming sounder, it is worth asking whether growth could be
accelerated through greater reliance on exports in the medium term.
This question is also relevant in other Central and East European coun-
tries. With relatively low inflation, stronger growth and improving
prospects of EU accession, a key challenge has become the need to
develop a policy environment that will facilitate faster catching up with
EU countries. Since some of the fastest growing economies since the
1960s have been the Asian countries, which have sustained high growth
rates of exports, there has been considerable interest in their export-led
growth strategy. It may therefore come as a surprise that recent studies
of the Asian experience cast doubt on the benefits of an export-orient-
ed growth strategy and its applicability in Central and Eastern Europe.
Four results stand out. 
• The empirical evidence on the positive long-run relationship between
exports and economic growth is weak. Medina-Smith (2001)
reviewed for the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) 42 empirical studies on exports and growth
published since the late 1960s. He concluded that recent econometric
evidence does not support the view that exports cause growth, as
many economists maintained until recently and as early studies sug-
gested. For instance, internal forces – in particular strong domestic
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competition – have been more important for Japan’s economic suc-
cess in the post-World War II period than external trade (Boltho, 1996). 
• Useful lessons from the Asian experience that are applicable to EU
accession countries are not the ones usually emphasised in public dis-
cussions about exports and growth – subsidies to export industries.
Rather, the useful lessons are fairly commonsense and “boring”: the
importance of sound macroeconomic policies and strong domestic
competition; an outward oriented trade regime; and public support for
the development of trade infrastructure (export financing and insur-
ance, market research, dissemination of information about foreign
market opportunities, training and education in export-related skills
and technology transfer) (Kokko, 2003). 
• Rather than being an example to follow, heavy intervention is the sin-
gle most important negative lesson of the Asian experience. Selective
large-scale export promotion schemes have been very costly in terms
of growth and efficiency. Such schemes have often been interpreted
as a signal that market prices and short-term nominal profits do not
matter in heavily supported industries. The moral hazard involved has
contributed to too much risky investment, resulting in excess supply
and downward pressure on prices. In addition, the sectors that have
not been supported have faced a heavier tax burden and crowding-out
in credit markets, with further complications if the export promotion
measures have been financed through foreign borrowing. 
• Finally, it is worth noting that, since the Asian crisis of 1997–98, the
Asian emerging economies themselves have started to move away
from reliance on exports to domestic demand as a more stable source
of growth in the long term. One reason has been that, by expanding
capacity in export industries and neglecting non-tradable sectors,
these countries have become overly dependent on external demand
and began to suffer from inefficiencies in the domestic markets. The
crisis has also exposed some weaknesses of the export-oriented model
that had been long ignored, such as the tolerance of financial repres-
sion and of opaque governance (Asian Development Bank, 1998).
What are the implications of these findings for the
current debate on exports and growth in Croatia?
First, even though the benefits and applicability of an export-ori-
ented growth strategy seem to be more limited than previously thought,
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one should not jump to the conclusion that the observed pattern of
growth in Croatia is satisfactory. As noted above, domestic demand and
net exports have been fairly volatile. Such pronounced cyclicality,
although a feature of the great majority of emerging market economies,
does not provide assurance that rapid growth in any particular year will
be sustained over a longer period. 
Second, instead of trying to develop a wide-ranging “export strat-
egy” or reinvent industrial policy, it is far more important for sound eco-
nomic development to foster domestic competition and the traditional –
i.e., limited – economic roles for the government: a well-functioning
legal and judicial system, transparent regulation of market competition,
and the provision of infrastructure, education, and social services in
those cases where the market outcomes are not satisfactory. Judging by
the experience of present EU members and successful transition
economies, such efforts would not only help develop a vibrant export
industry but would also well serve Croatia’s EU accession efforts.
ADJUSTING TO CURRENT ACCOUNT
DEFICITS
Have the size and variability of the current account deficits in
Croatia been excessive? Economists’ and policymakers’ views of cur-
rent account imbalances have undergone several changes over the last
25 years. Currently there is no consensus, either with respect to the crit-
ical size of such deficits or their usefulness as indicators of a potential
balance of payments or currency crisis. For a while it was thought that
external deficits did not matter if the public sector was in equilibrium
and the deficits reflected private sector decisions. This view (also
known as the Lawson Doctrine) was challenged by the Asian financial
crisis of 1997–98, in which external indebtedness of the private sector
led to economy-wide crises even though public sector positions were in
balance. Some now argue that when the current account deficit reaches
a certain critical size it becomes a source of concern regardless of
whether the domestic counterpart is a public or private saving deficit.
Others take the view that current account deficits might get “too large”
but that it is hard to predict the size and timing of such a threshold due
to its sensitivity to swings in investor aversion to risk.
Most Central and Eastern European countries have been running
large current account deficits since the beginning of the transition. Such
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deficits are to be expected for countries in the process of catching up,
as domestic investment is likely to exceed domestic saving. For the 12
countries shown in Table 1, the current account deficits have averaged
4.5% of GDP during 1994–2002, with a peak in 1998 of 6.5%. There
are wide variations across the region. Croatia has had slightly higher
current account deficits (5% of GDP) and greater variability of deficits
than the regional average. The Baltic countries have had the largest
deficits (almost 7% of GDP on average). Slovenia’s external account
has been largely balanced.   
Table 1 Current account balances and FDI inflows1
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Countries Current account Net FDI inflows
FDI/Current
Account
Percentages of GDP Ratio
Bulgaria –2.2 4.0 1.80
Croatia –5.1 3.6 0.70
Czech Republic –3.8 6.7 1.75
Estonia –6.8 5.5 0.80
Hungary –4.5 4.0 0.90
Latvia –5.7 6.2 1.10
Lithuania –8.0 3.7 0.45
Poland –3.9 3.5 0.90
Romania –5.0 2.5 0.50
Slovakia –5.5 3.4 0.60
Slovenia –0.1 2.2 5.00
FR Yugoslavia2 –6.4 1.5 0.24
Average –4.6 3.9 0.903
1 Annual data, average for 1994–2002.
2 Data for 1996–2002.
3 Excluding Slovenia.
Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsbericht, December 2002; UN Economic
Commission for Europe; OECD Economic Outlook; author’s calculations
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have on average
financed 90% of the current account deficits in Central and Eastern
Europe (70% in the case of Croatia). Privatisation has had a significant
influence on both the size and the volatility of such inflows.
Nonetheless, for most countries, including Croatia, FDI inflows have
actually been more stable than the current account imbalances.
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Latvia have been particularly suc-
cessful in attracting FDI. Slovakia was a relatively late starter with
respect to privatisation and FDI, but is now catching up rapidly. Net
FDI inflows in Croatia were below the average for the region over
1994–2002, but over 1999–2002 the inflows increased to 5.5% of GDP
per annum. Slovenia has relied on a policy of promoting domestic sav-
ing to finance investment. Consequently, few enterprises have been pri-
vatised and FDI inflows have been moderate. 
Thus, evidence that the Croatian economy has been running
large current account deficits does not in itself indicate a fundamental
weakness. The issue is, rather, how the economy adjusts to occasional
surges in external deficits. To address this issue, Croatia’s experience
has been compared with recent episodes of current account reversals in
a sample of 31 emerging economies over the period from 1995–2002.iii
Following Edwards (2001), the reversal was defined as a fall in the cur-
rent account/GDP ratio of 3 percentage points or more in one year. In
the great majority of cases, this meant a reduction in the current account
deficit or a swing from a deficit to a surplus. 
Croatia experienced current account reversals in 1998 and 2000.
The 1998 reversal was associated with a large decline in output – GDP
growth fell by 4.25 percentage points (Figure 5).iv However, the rever-
sal in 2000 was achieved without any loss in output – Croatia’s growth
rate actually increased by 3.75 percentage points that year. The reasons
for this differing performance were both domestic and external.
• Domestically, 1998 saw a major banking crisis, with failure of several
medium-sized banks (the largest one being Dubrovaèka Banka). This
resulted in a sharp drop in bank credit to the private sector and hence
a decline in imports, production and household consumption.
Externally, 1998 was marked by crises in Asia and Russia and failure
of a large hedge fund (LTCM) in the United States, which threatened
to cut off liquidity in international capital markets. The Croatian econ-
omy was thus exposed to both domestic and external shocks in 1998
and had to adjust the hard way: growth fell from 6.8% in 1997 to 2.5%;
investment fell by 1% of GDP and the volume of imports by 8%.
• The situation in 2000 was quite different. The world economy, and in
particular that of the EU, were still in an upswing, which provided an
external stimulus to the Croatian economy. Domestically, the year
2000 was characterised by a sharp increase in public sector indebted-
ness, partly associated with the settlement of government arrears to
enterprises. Together with export demand, this provided a moderate
stimulus to the economy, so that the current account adjustment was
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associated with a 3.75 percentage point increase in output growth and
a 4% increase in the volume of exports. 
Figure 5 Current account adjustment and change un GDP growth
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Turning to the recent widening of the current account deficit –
to 7.25% of GDP in 2002 and an estimated 9.5% of GDP in the first half
of 2003 – the question arises which of the above two episodes provides
a better indication of the likely pattern of adjustment of the Croatian
economy. In particular, does the 2000 episode provide certain assur-
ance that the large current account deficit can be corrected in an order-
ly manner, i.e., through slower growth of private consumption, invest-
ment and imports, and a moderate improvement in exports? Recent
developments provide some grounds to expect such a scenario. 
• First, the external environment improved considerably in the
second half of 2003 and projections for 2004 foresee an acceleration of
growth to 2% in Western Europe and 4% in the United States.
Moreover, a cycle of tightening monetary policy in industrial countries
is not expected to begin before the middle of 2004. Thus, the current
account adjustment in Croatia should take place in a favourable inter-
national environment. 
• Second, judging by preliminary balance of payments data for
the third quarter of 2003 and projections for the full year, the Croatian
economy is already adjusting the high current account imbalance.
Private consumption is projected to slow to about 4.5% this year (from
6.5% in 2002), government consumption has continued to fall in real
terms, and investment has remained strong (a growth rate of 14% is
projected for the full year; see Institute of Economics, Zagreb (2003)).
Furthermore, after a good tourist season, the external sector could make
a small positive contribution to growth this year.v
Based on these developments, one can be cautiously optimistic
about the ability of the Croatian economy to adjust relatively smoothly
to the run-up in the current account deficit in 2002 and the first half of
2003 in particular, so there is no need to tamper with the exchange rate.
Such a course of action would unavoidably have wide-ranging negative
effects on the economy, given that the balance sheets of banks, enter-
prises and households are heavily euroised, and given the large foreign
currency-denominated public debt.
FINANCING THE EXPANSION
A major factor contributing to the dynamism of domestic
demand in Croatia over the past few years has been rapid expansion of
banking sector credit. This development has raised a number of con-
cerns, from worries about the deterioration of credit quality and
increased banking system vulnerability, to fears that economic growth
might falter should the lending boom subside. This section examines to
what extent these concerns could be justified. 
The first point to note is that the phenomenon of rapid credit
growth has not been restricted to Croatia. Following a period of privati-
sation and restructuring, commercial banks in Central and Eastern
Europe have been rapidly expanding their lending to the private sector
since 2000. The growth rates of bank lending in Bulgaria, Croatia, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia have recently ranged
from 20–110% per annum. These growth rates to a large extent reflect
base effects: with the exception of Croatia, the share of household lend-
ing in overall bank credit is still very low in the region (Table 2), and
the stock of bank loans in relation to GDP is low compared to industri-
al and the more advanced emerging market economies. As shown in
Cottarelli et al (2003), even if all the increase in credit finances addi-
tional demand, a rapid rise in credit will lead to an overheating only if
the initial stock of loans is sufficiently large in relation to GDP. 
The second point is that Croatia is the only country in the region
where the composition of commercial bank lending has evolved closer
to that found in mature market economies. At around 45% of total
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loans, the share of bank lending to households in Croatia is higher than
the share of corporate loans and by far the highest in the region – loans
to households have exceeded 20% of total loans only in Poland and
Slovenia. By contrast, net claims on government, which are insignifi-
cant in Croatia, have ranged from around 20% of total loans in the
Czech Republic and Slovenia, to 48% in Slovakia (Table 2). The more
mature structure of bank lending and the relatively high initial stock of
private sector credit (around 50% of GDP) are features that make
Croatia potentially vulnerable to lending booms.
Table 2 Composition of commercial bank lending, 20021
Government2 Corporate Household
Bulgaria 1.6 79.2 19.2 
Croatia 5.9 48.9 45.2 
Czech Republic 21.2 60.1 18.7 
Estonia 6.3 56.3 37.4 
Hungary 34.0 48.0 18.1 
Latvia 7.2 74.6 18.1 
Lithuania 36.5 53.1 10.4 
Poland 26.2 43.8 29.9 
Romania 23.7 58.9 17.4 
Slovakia 47.5 41.5 11.0 
Slovenia 21.6 54.9 23.5 
1 In percent of total credit, excluding interbank credit and credit to non-bank financial
institutions. Data for end-2002 or the latest period available.
2 Net claims on government.  
Sources: BIS; IMF; national data
To what extent, then, has credit expansion in Croatia been
“excessive”? A useful benchmark in this regard is the annual increase
in credit equivalent to 5% of GDP or higher. Countries that experienced
credit booms followed by a banking crisis have often seen credit
expanding by 5–10% of GDP per year for an extended period (see
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). Credit growth in Croatia was
above this benchmark from mid-1997 to early 1999, and has exceeded
it again since March 2001 (Figure 6). During both booms, the annual
increase in private sector credit peaked at around 13% of GDP. The first
credit boom was followed by the banking crisis of 1998–99. The caus-
es of that crisis were more complex, however, and were only partly
related to the credit boom (see Kraft and Jankov (2003), and Vujèiæ,
2003). The second boom apparently started to subside in 2003.
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One of the key differences between the two episodes is that the
banking system in Croatia has become more robust since the late 1990s.
Most banks have been privatised and are now partly or fully owned by
reputable foreign banks. Reflecting better risk management and greater
efficiency, prudential indicators have improved considerably in recent
years: the share of non-performing loans declined by one-half since
1999; a high capital adequacy ratio has been maintained (close to 20%);
provisions for loan losses have increased to 86% of non-performing
loans (the second highest level in the region); and return on assets has
more than doubled (Table 3). In addition, commercial bank liquidity
has improved: the primary liquidity ratio (the ratio of highly liquid
assets to deposits which are subject to reserve requirements) has
increased from 1.3% at end-1999 to 3.3% in May 2003.
Figure 6 Growth of private sector credit, January 1997-May 2003
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Nevertheless, one needs to wonder for how long banks can con-
tinue to expand their balance sheets by 10–15% per year without run-
ning into funding difficulties. Figure 7 indicates that, from mid-2000 to
mid-2002, savings and foreign currency deposits of residents expanded
at annual rates of up to 40%, making it possible to finance credit expan-
sion entirely from domestic sources. Since mid-2002, however, the
growth of savings and foreign currency deposits has sharply decelerat-
ed, turning negative in December 2002 and becoming virtually flat in
January 2003. At the same time, foreign liabilities have jumped sharply
(by 14 billion kuna, almost  2 billion, between May 2002 and May
2003), implying that commercial banks have financed the continuing
expansion of domestic credit almost entirely from foreign sources. This
situation is unsustainable. Precautionary measures taken by the
Croatian National Bank in 2003 to restrict the growth of commercial
bank lending are thus justified.
Table 3 Prudential indicators for the banking sector
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Non-performing
loans1
Capital
adequacy2
Loan-loss
provisions3
Return on assets
1999 20024 1999 20024 1999 20024 1999 20024
Bulgaria 29.0 13.0 43.0 29.0 9.9 8.7 2.5 2.2
Croatia 11.8 6.2 20.6 18.5 77.1 86.1 0.7 1.6
Czech
Republic
22.0 13.7 13.6 15.4 52.2 59.1 –0.3 0.7
Hungary 3.6 2.6 14.9 13.9 52.6 53.8 0.6 2.0
Estonia 1.7 1.6 16.1 14.4 ... ... 1.4 2.5
Latvia 6.0 2.8 16.0 14.2 79.3 80.4 1.0 1.5
Lithuania 12.5 8.2 17.4 15.7 ... ... 0.5 1.0
Poland 13.2 17.8 13.2 15.0 104.4 102.0 1.6 1.4
Romania 0.75 0.7 42.75 55.0 ... ... 1.54 3.1
Slovakia 23.7 14.0 29.5 21.9 6.4 2.5 –4.0 1.2
Slovenia 5.2 5.4 14.0 11.9 44.6 39.1 0.8 0.4
1 As percent of total loans.
2 Risk-weighted capital-asset ratio.
3 As percent of non-performing loans.
4 Data for end-2002 or the latest period available.
5 Data for end-2000.
Sources: Central bank publications and websites; IMF country reports
Another potential concern is that greater competition among
banks can result in excessive contraction of intermediation margins,
affecting the financial position of banks. This has been a major issue in
recent years for banks in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia and the Baltic states, as intense competition has pushed mar-
gins below or very close to those prevailing in banks located in Austria,
Germany and Italy (Table 4). This situation is probably untenable in the
medium term given the higher efficiency of banks in western Europe.
However, margins between lending and deposit rates, as well as
between lending and interbank rates (a good indicator of banks’ fund-
ing costs), are still relatively high in Croatia. This indicates that com-
mercial banks in Croatia still have room for manoeuvre left and that
their financial position may not immediately suffer in the case of a
slowdown in business activity. 
Figure 7 Commercial bank liabilities, May 1995-May 2003
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In summary, there are reasons to remain cautious with regard to
the financing of the recent lending boom. While prudential indicators
point to a relatively sound banking system, one should keep in mind
that these indicators are backward looking. On the other hand, there is
evidence that credit growth to the private sector has entered a zone
where increased vulnerability is not excluded. In particular, the surge in
foreign liabilities of commercial banks raises both macroeconomic and
prudential concerns. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS: PREPARING
FOR CAPITAL INFLOWS
The Croatian public has for some time been presented with a
fairly pessimistic assessment of the growth performance of the Croatian
economy and the outlook for the external sector. According to this
view, rapid expansion of bank lending to households and government
borrowing for infrastructure projects have led to an unsustainable
growth of domestic demand and imports. At the same time, it has been
argued, Croatian exports have disappointed over the past decade
because of an “overvalued” exchange rate, the lack of an “export strat-
egy”, and failed privatisation and restructuring efforts. The result of
such unbalanced growth has been excessive current account deficits
and unsustainable increases in external and public sector debt.
According to this view, then, a balance of payments crisis before or in
lieu of the EU accession is more or less inevitable.
In contrast to this view, this paper has argued that clearer signs
of healthier growth have emerged in the past 3–4 years. Moreover, the
Croatian economy should be able to adjust to the widening external
deficit in 2002–03 in an orderly manner. However, as regards the
expansion in private sector credit, there are reasons for concern, and pre-
cautionary measures taken by the Croatian National Bank are justified.
Looking ahead, a major challenge for macroeconomic policy in
the run-up to the EU accession could come from symptoms of  “too
great” success – i.e., large capital inflows – rather than the lack of suc-
cess. If Croatia becomes an official EU candidate in 2004, it will have
good chances to join the EU together with Bulgaria and Romania in
2007. This could lead to increased inflows of both long-term and short-
term capital, putting pressure on domestic money supply, the exchange
rate and aggregate demand. The Croatian economy, like other central
European economies, has several features that make it susceptible to such
inflows. The first such feature is the much higher (pre-inflow) rate of
return on investment, reflecting imbalances in initial stocks of capital and
a relatively rich endowment of skilled labour. This differential will
induce capital inflows for so long as the present value of expected gains
from investment exceeds the cost of funds to investors. The setting of
macroeconomic policies will therefore need to take account of the strength
of underlying investment demand that capital inflows represent. vi
The second such feature is the tendency for consumer price
inflation in Croatia, as in other accession countries, to be higher than in
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the euro area. This may reflect macroeconomic policies that are too lax
(especially fiscal policy). But it may also reflect important real factors
related to the transition process, in particular the tendency for prices of
non-tradable goods to rise faster than the prices of tradables as real
wages rise in the wake of rising productivity (the so-called Balassa-
Samuelson effect; see Mihaljek and Klau, 2003). In countries with
fixed exchange rates, these forces have manifested themselves in (CPI-
based) real exchange rate appreciation, while in countries with floating
exchange rates they have manifested themselves partly in nominal
exchange rate appreciation, and partly in higher inflation. Given this
inflation differential and the associated tendency of real exchange rates
to appreciate, nominal interest rates in the accession countries have
tended to be higher than in the euro area. 
Such nominal interest rate differentials, although narrowing
(Figure 8), remain sufficiently large to have an important impact on
capital flows. The recent Hungarian experience illustrates this point
vividly. Short-term inflows estimated at some  4–5 billion (equivalent
to 7–8% of annual GDP) entered Hungary within only a few hours on
15–16 January 2003. The inflows were fuelled by both high interest
rate differentials and the speculation that the 15% limit for appreciation
of the forint above its central parity against the euro would be lifted. To
deter inflows, the National Bank cut policy rates by 200 basis points
within two days, introduced a quantitative restriction on short-term
deposits, and intervened heavily in the foreign exchange market. While
these extraordinary measures calmed speculation, lower interest rates
combined with the ensuing depreciation of the forint have aggravated
inflationary pressures, forcing the central bank to raise its inflation
forecast for 2003.
A second problem potentially facing Croatia is that, like all
emerging market economies, it remains exposed to capital flow rever-
sals, especially if inflows result in both overvaluation and rising infla-
tion. A particular concern is what might happen if the ambitious fiscal
deficit reduction strategy were to go off track. Since non-residents are
expected to become major buyers of newly issued public debt, given
the promise of medium-term sustainability, such an event could lead to
a sudden reversal of portfolio capital flows, causing the currency to
depreciate sharply. This course of events can again be illustrated by the
Hungarian experience. In mid-June 2003, monetary policy was tight-
ened sharply after a poorly communicated decision to devalue the
forint’s fixed fluctuation band damaged investor confidence and trig-
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gered heavy selling of domestic currency bonds. In order to reduce
these risks and lessen the problem of capital flow reversals, Croatia
would thus be well advised not to rush with liberalisation of the remain-
ing capital controls.
Figure 8 Official interest rates (%)
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Third, large capital inflows might worsen pre-existing currency
mismatches. While banks in Croatia are required to balance their open
foreign positions by prudential regulations, by granting loans in euros
they may simply replace foreign exchange risk by credit risk, as their
customers may not be earning foreign currency. Because of such cur-
rency mismatches, Croatia’s banking systems is highly vulnerable to
volatile exchange rate movements. Furthermore, as debt is already
skewed towards foreign rather than domestic liabilities, volatile
exchange rate movements could also give rise to debt sustainability
problems.
It should be emphasised that the policy challenges facing the
accession countries in the presence of large capital inflows are largely
independent of the exchange rate regime. Because the mechanisms
motivating capital inflows are real rather than monetary, the only ques-
tion is whether a real appreciation takes place through nominal appre-
ciation or through inflation. Under a fixed regime (or a fixed but
adjustable peg), capital inflows will reduce interest rates and increase
investment relative to domestic saving. If inflation rises, external com-
petitiveness would decline. Under a floating regime, capital inflows
would lead the exchange rate to appreciate, again causing a loss of com-
petitiveness and potentially generating a current account deficit. While
various fundamental and institutional factors may impart some friction
to this process, it is not likely that these frictions would be sufficient to
afford the accession countries any significant interest rate autonomy,
given capital mobility and the convergence of long-term interest rates
to euro area levels.
In summary, policy makers in Croatia will have to conduct a
very careful policy aimed at setting interest rates at an appropriate
level:  setting them too high would invite excessive short-term inflows,
while setting them too low would lead to excessive investment and thus
inflation. This is often referred to in the literature as the “Tošovský
dilemma” (see Lipschitz et all., 2002b). As Croatia has limited capaci-
ty to respond to large movements in capital flows, it may find it neces-
sary to satisfy the Maastricht criteria even before it becomes a member
of the EU. This will require substantial fiscal adjustment in the next few
years. Mobilising support for such adjustment will be difficult, howev-
er, given the large public expenditure needs and the fact that the deficits
can be financed relatively easily at the moment.
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i For instance, the contribution of domestic demand is calculated as (DDt – DDt-1)/Yt-
1, where DDt is given by the sum of private and government consumption and fixed
investment in year t, and Y is gross domestic product. By definition, contributions of
individual components of GDP add up to the growth rate of the GDP. 
ii The share of government consumption in GDP (22% in 2002) is smaller than the
share of general government expenditure in GDP (50%), as the latter also includes
redistribution through the pension and social security system (which is included in
private consumption in national accounts) and public investment (which is included
in gross fixed capital formation). 
iii For details of the data sample and analysis, see Mihaljek (2003b). 
iv The points in Figure 5 indicate changes in the growth rate of GDP (in percentage
points, measured along the vertical axis) during different episodes of current account
reversals (measured in percent of GDP along the horizontal axis). The regression
line shows that, for each percentage point reduction in the current account deficit,
the growth rate in emerging market economies declined on average by 1.06 percent-
age points. 
v Exports of goods and services are projected to expand by 11% in 2003, and imports
of goods and services by 8.8% (Institute of Economics, Zagreb (2003)). This would
imply a decrease in the balance of goods and services and hence a positive contribu-
tion of net exports of about 0.25 of a percentage point.
vi Lipschitz et all. (2002a) estimate the marginal product of capital to be 8.5 times high-
er in the accession countries than in Germany, and on this basis calculate potential
capital inflows at close to 5 times the initial (pre-inflow) GDP in central Europe.
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